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Brian Benjamin Hansen
Thinking is a Thing: 
Hegel’s use of Examples
I. THE EXAMPLE
What is the act of giving an example? What kind of thinking is done 
when a concept is exemplified? Are there different ways of using exam-
ples? I have for some time been working on these questions, which I 
think touch the core of what one could call the method of philosophy. 
Philosophy is about doing conceptual, not empirical, work, but how 
does philosophy bring its concepts to life? Maybe one of the most 
prominent ways of doing this is in the process of giving examples. 
Before I get to the specific topic of this article, namely Hegel’s use of 
examples, which is quite astonishing, I would like briefly to rephrase 
my basic approach to the topic of the example.
In the ordinary understanding of the function of the example, 
we use examples when we mean to illustrate or clarify something 
(usually a difficult concept or theory). In this “heuristic” use of the 
example, the example is meant to transform something rather ab-
stract into something concrete or understandable. At the University 
of Manchester, they maintain a so-called Academic Phrasebank, which 
has achieved an almost iconic status, when it comes to explaining ac-
ademic lingo. The article on “Giving Examples” says that: “Writers 
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may give specific examples as evidence to support their general claims 
or arguments. Examples can also be used to help the reader or listener 
understand unfamiliar or difficult concepts, and they tend to be easier 
to remember. For this reason, they are often used in teaching.”1 As the 
article has it, examples support general claims, and they are helpful to 
the reader and listener. 
However, there is also, undeniably, something else at stake, when 
we use examples. The example is not always as smooth-running and 
helpful as it should be. In philosophy, this is a well-known experience: 
When you give examples of some of the fundamental concepts, like 
freedom, anxiety, negativity etc., you get the feeling that this is not 
quite it. You give an example of freedom, but it is only a “petty” ex-
ample, not the thing itself. Approaching the example heuristically, this 
is easily explained: The example is here understood simply as a helpful 
device for transferring some of the content of a concept to someone 
more stupid than yourself, a student for example. It is no surprise, 
then, that the example delivers less than what its concept promised. 
It delivers less, but you understand more, because abstract thought 
has been reduced to a concrete, palpable example. However, there is, I 
claim, another way of approaching the example. 
What if examples not only deliver less, but also sometimes more, 
than what their concepts promised? What if there in this way is a cer-
tain materiality of the example, a certain “excess of stuff” connected 
to the example, even a retroactive force, so that good examples back-
wardly change the ideas and concepts they were merely supposed to 
exemplify? This is, I think, also related to a very common experience 
in philosophy: There is no “neutral” example, examples are highly 
telling, sometimes the example even takes the center-stage of a certain 
philosophical position, so that we really only engage in the philosophy 
of Plato when engaging in the example of the cave, the philosophy 
of Descartes when engaging in the example of the piece of wax, the 
philosophy of Sartre when engaging in the example of the walk in the 
park, or of looking through a keyhole, or hanging out at the café, and 
so on. Examples are “at work” in philosophical texts. There is a certain 
incompatibility between concept and example, which is productive for 
thought itself. There is, one could say, “example-work”, in the same 
way as there a “dream-work” in Freud. My claim would be, then, that 
the ways in which philosophers use examples provide (one of) the roy-
al roads towards the way they think and develop thought. 
It seems that some thinkers are able to exploit this capacity of the 
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example to its full, and as Slavoj Žižek has articulated it, this amounts 
to what he calls “the materialist use of examples”2. What does this 
expression mean? There is a materiality of the example, not because it 
is concrete, in contrast to the abstract, spectral ravings of the concept, 
but because it brings in something extra, which shouldn’t be there, 
but which still is essential for the concept itself. Wasn’t Freud one of 
the great masters of the material use of examples, when he gave the 
famous example of the dream of Irma, which was absolutely crucial for 
the development of the concept of the unconscious? The unconscious 
really only became the unconscious due to the intervention of this 
example. When such an example is given, we realize that it touches 
something at the core of a concept, at the same time – and maybe 
exactly therefore – as it transgresses the very conceptual frame it was 
put in. Put in another (more Lacanian) way: Thought does in some 
sense loose itself in the example, but what is hereby expressed is only 
thought’s own “real” kernel, thought’s own antagonistic relationship 
to itself. Of course, it is Žižek himself, which is today’s master of such 
a practice. In this article, however, I’m going to trace what could be 
called the roots of the materialist use of examples in classical philoso-
phy, maybe at the very climax of classical philosophy, namely in He-
gel’s use of examples, especially in his masterpiece The Phenomenology 
of Spirit. 
It should be obvious that Hegel does not have the same “aggres-
sive”-materialist use of examples as for example Žižek (in Žižek you 
will be bombarded with examples, totally overburdened by them, or 
the same example will be repeated again and again and again, i.e. the 
Rabinovitch-joke). However, what is so interesting about Hegel is that 
he brings the tension between concept and example to its maximum. 
This is what I will investigate in the following. I do not claim to pres-
ent a total interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy, but I do think that 
from this (limited) perspective a slightly new Hegel comes to light. 
Not the Hegel of an “absolute spirit” in the sense of a total reconcile-
ment of spirit with itself (the Hegel that Lacan often criticizes). But 
the Hegel of a certain unrest in spirit; a surplus-spirit, one could say, 
which is exactly played out in its examples.
II. EXISTENTIAL DRAMATIZATIONS
The Phenomenology of Spirit is no normal book, even among philosophi-
cal books it stands out. The project of the book is no less than to make 
a theory of “it all” (“das Ganze”). Hegel is a philosopher, but he is 
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also what one could call the “philosopher’s philosopher”, in that he 
does not restrict himself to defending a certain philosophical truth, 
in competition with others; his project is rather to conceive of the 
very work of reason, the very creation and succession of philosophical 
truths. The project is to fathom how reason, also called spirit, moves 
through history, how there is a historicity of spirit. But how is this 
exactly possible? From what position is one allowed to do this? This is 
where the originality of Hegel’s position lies. His project is very ambi-
tious, in that he wants to surpass all previous philosophical positions 
– this is why he sticks to the “master-concept” of spirit – and it is at 
the same time very modest and respectful in its approach: Surpassing 
philosophy can only be done beginning from the inside of philosophy, 
from a thorough working-through of the philosophical positions that 
must be surpassed.
How can this approach can be articulated in terms of concept 
and example? Even though Hegel has a master-concept, called spirit, 
spirit is not a Platonic idea, firmly placed in the heaven of ideas. To be-
come itself, spirit must move out of itself – spirit is not monologic, but 
dialectical. This is what is played out repeatedly in The Phenomenology 
of Spirit: the concept of spirit is exemplified – in the different chapters 
“Sense-certainty”, “Observing reason”, “Self-alienated spirit” etc. – 
and the strange thing is that the example every time produces more 
than one could expect, and this is spirit. What I mean here by “exem-
plified” is central: At stake is first of all a relation between universal 
(spirit) and particular (scientific or philosophical position), but there 
is in Hegel’s acts of exemplification also a certain wager: That this par-
ticular/example, this showing or appearance of spirit, has something 
important to say. The particular is not interesting if it is simply partic-
ular, but only if it can begin to function as an example, as something 
that relates to, and challenges, the universal concept it exemplifies. 
To exemplify would in this sense also be to challenge and to raise the 
stakes, to dramatize, as I shall argue in the following. If spirit was a 
pure Platonic idea no example would be able to match up to it. But in 
Hegelian thinking it is almost the other way around: The very work 
of the example, which brings the pure concept into trouble, precisely 
is “unrestful” spirit. To be clear: Spirit is all, it is “das Ganze”, but it 
is not pure, not one, not unity, it is conflict, equivocal; it is in conflict 
with itself. Spirit is thus played out in its examples. In a certain way, 
spirit gives these examples – the examples are examples of spirit – but 
it only “moves” by being undermined by them3. There is a certain suc-
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cess of the example, precisely when it undermines its concept, brings 
something extra into it, or points to a certain conflict in it.
Spirit is only accessible through these examples, which we will 
have to work through, before we can enter new examples. The Phenom-
enology of Spirit is thus somewhat like a Bildungsroman, as Judith Butler 
has put it. Hegel does not mechanically lay bare some general princi-
ples for spirit; the book is more like a pilgrimage of the spirit: “The 
narrative”, says Butler, “discloses and enacts a strategy for appropri-
ating philosophical truth; it sets the ontological stage in a variety of 
ways, compels our belief in the reality of that staged scene, encour-
ages our identification with the emergent subject that the scene in-
cludes, and then asks us to suffer the inevitable failure of that subject’s 
quest for identity within the confines of that scene” (Butler 2012: 
21). In prolongation of Butler’s description, Žižek has convincingly 
remarked how The Phenomenology of Spirit could be characterized as a 
kind of “hysterical theater»4. Throughout the book, we see the differ-
ent figures, shapes, of consciousness. These are not abstract, “dead” 
positions – they are not like well-formed textbooks examples of dif-
ferent philosophical positions or paradigms. They are scenes, where 
consciousness posits itself, tries to reflect itself and come to terms 
with itself, but fails. The scenes are, in Žižek’s words, “existential dra-
matizations” of theoretical positions – they are dramatizations, which 
always produce some kind of surplus5. Spirit is put in scene, but once 
the drama begins to unfold, the scene evolves into something, which 
was not accounted for in the first place, even though nothing from the 
outside is brought in. Butler is right to emphasize not only the tragic, 
“blind” side of spirit’s adventures, but also the comedy of it. There is 
a Mr. Magoo-like quality of spirit: Mr. Magoo is the little funny car-
toon-character, who (from Wikipedia) “gets into a series of comical 
situations as a result of his extreme near-sightedness, compounded by 
his stubborn refusal to admit the problem”,6 but always lands on all 
four wheels of his little car again.
So, what is the result of all this? I would claim that Hegel is all 
about a fundamental unrest of spirit. What is interesting about Hegel 
from this perspective is not his way of synthesizing different positions 
with each other, but his way of making existential dramas out of the-
ory. Spirit always presents itself in an example, which does not fit, or 
which brings the concept into trouble, and – once again – this is exact-
ly the point. There are many examples of spirit in The Phenomenology 
of Spirit, and spirit is fully in each and every one of them. It is not 
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that spirit is partially exemplified in the chapter of “Sense-Certain-
ty”, partially in the chapter on “Observing Reason” etc. Spirit is fully 
there, as the very conflict the example brings forth in relation to the 
starting point. Thus, it is the function of the example, not to illustrate 
spirit, or to make us better understand what spirit is or can be, but to 
continuously change the very concept of spirit. The examples perform 
a kind work, which in a certain sense borrows its energy from spirit – 
for Hegel spirit still has ontological priority – but without which spirit 
would not be what it is. The example seems to be the site of an essen-
tial symptom of spirit (I borrow the gist of this argument from Mlad-
en Dolar7): When spirit is exemplified, or played out in a dramatic 
scene, something always goes wrong, a symptom appears, and yet the 
symptom cannot be removed – if we remove it, we remove spirit itself. 
Therefore, spirit is nothing but the very succession of symptomatic 
examples, each of them ridden with new contradictions. 
This could also be expressed through one of Žižek’s readings of 
Hegel8. What if a good, dialectical example in fact shows us a univer-
sal dimension (the dimension of spirit), not directly, but by exposing 
some unstable particular situation? In Hegel, universality is not the 
pure dimension of spirit, untouched by the particular (e.g. “the pure 
idea of the state” as opposed to all existing states), but Hegel’s inves-
tigation does neither simply aim to show how every universality is 
tainted by certain particular forces (“the pure idea of the state” is only 
the state of the ruling class). The universal shows itself, according to 
(Žižek’s reading of) Hegel in another way. It shows itself when a giv-
en particular situation comes into conflict with itself, when it cannot 
come to terms with itself. It is, from Žižek and Hegel’s viewpoint, 
precisely when a state cannot come to terms with itself (and become 
fully integrated and harmonious), but is haunted by conflict and an-
tagonism, that is shows its true universal dimension. For a dialectician 
it is all about identifying these “thwarted particularities”. One must 
set out to find the examples that cannot live up to their concept, but 
which exactly in this way come to reveal the true split core of the con-
cept. The universal concept is by necessity linked to a failed exemplifi-
cation; a failed exemplification which – again – is turned into success. 
III. THINKING IS A THING
Hegel has an astonishing use of examples, which lays bare spirit’s con-
flict with itself. He knows how to push them, so that every example 
ends up giving more than what was planned for. What I will argue is 
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that there is a “strategy of the example” in Hegel; a strategy which is 
played out in the very composition of the work, as well as implicit in 
the development of the different examples, or ontological scenes, that 
the book consists of. My argument could in some regards be seen as 
drawing on certain deconstructionist approaches9, but I nonetheless 
think there is a crucial difference (though I will not engage in a sub-
stantial discussion with these approaches here). In Irene E. Harvey’s 
seminal work on examples, she wants to think ways of using exam-
ples that would finally redeem the traditional Western metaphysical 
framework of general and particular. “Examples always exceed what-
ever frame one seeks to place around them, or whatever cage one tries 
to capture them with”, she argues, and there is in the example an “ex-
cess from every theory to date”10. What she wants to do is to somehow 
free this excess from its conceptual framing; she wants to engage in 
the plurality, multidimensionality and “dissemination” of the exam-
ple, beyond identity and unity, and the way in which it cannot even be 
usurped by dialectical oppositional thinking11. However, this is not my 
project. I do not want to give up Hegelian metaphysics and go into the 
non-conceptual, non-dialectical excess; rather, I want to show that if 
there is a non-dialectical excess in Hegel – if the example does not fit 
into the conceptual framework – this feature can exactly be deployed 
to think metaphysically in a materialist way. The way the materialist 
example fires back into the concept is for me what is central. 
But how is this done? How does Hegel push his examples? There 
is one passage in The Phenomenology of Spirit, which seems to be perfect 
in order to answer these questions. What I have in mind is the famous 
chapter on “Observing Reason”, the chapter where Hegel engages in 
physiognomy and phrenology, among other things12. The chapter is in 
many ways highly relevant in our time, because of its treatment of the 
relation between philosophy and empirically informed natural scienc-
es, but in what follows I will not go deep into this discussion. What I 
want to do here, is to describe Hegel’s approach: Why does this topic 
interest him at all? Why is this a good example? And what does his 
reading produce?
In the chapter on “Observing reason” the stakes are in fact really 
high. We are at a point in the drama where spirit begins to reflect itself 
in its relation to the outer world, and in a somewhat scientific way. We 
have gone through the figures of consciousness and self-consciousness 
and now we must examine reason, scientific reason. How can spirit 
observe itself, how can it understand itself in relation to its immedi-
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ate actuality. The question could also be posed: How can spirit un-
derstand itself as matter? How can thinking be a thing? Today, these 
questions are asked all the time, and they are very much researched in 
modern cognitive science. Modern brain-sciences would of course dis-
miss the concept of “spirit” to replace it with “processes”, “firing neu-
rons” and so on, but the problem remains. What is this “thing” which 
moves inside the MR-scanner, when you scan the brain? And whom 
or what “thing” is it that reflects and looks at itself as the “thing” 
moving? The question for Hegel is not whether the results of modern 
brain-sciences are true or false according to external reality (there are 
very likely true in relation to the premises behind the experiments 
conducted). The dialectical question is rather if these sciences can 
contribute to the unrestful, conflictual self-reflection of spirit. Hegel’s 
wager is that they can. Even if these kinds of sciences try to “mend the 
gap”, even if they try to once and for all explain how mental processes 
unfold (or at least make models to predict the processes), they often 
contribute to something else and much more fascinating namely to 
create new gaps and inconsistencies. If this piece of meat that I call my 
brain, which lights up in the MR-scanner, is the very definition of my 
mental abilities and its processes – reason itself explained – what kind 
of reason did then produce it as such? If we succeed in predicting what 
the brain does, does this mean that we have to obey these predictions? 
Today, you can “optimize your brain” as it is articulated in slogans, so 
you can concentrate better, make better decisions etc. But what kind 
of self is able to say yes or no to optimizing the brain? Is this self also 
in the brain somewhere, or in another place? What kind of scanner 
would be needed to predict this “other self”?
The question of the observability of spirit interests Hegel, be-
cause it points to a number of difficult questions, which in fact can be 
solved neither by philosophy nor by the natural sciences. Hegel’s way 
to intervene into the debate is primarily through a critique; a critique, 
which relates to a conflict in the very scientific position investigated. 
What is interesting in this position is how it cannot seem to come to 
terms with itself. But the critique also has a positive undercurrent. If 
Hegel could have known modern brain-sciences, he would probably 
see progress in them; both in terms of increased technical power, but 
also in terms of progress of thought. All it takes would be to take se-
riously the critical potentials of the brain-sciences themselves. What 
does its experiments mean for the very concept of spirit? 
There would of course be an easy way out of all the questions. A 
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Platonic-idealist approach to the question of spirit would (in a carica-
ture) probably simply state that “spirit” is so comprehensive a concept 
that no example will ever be able to exhaust it. In this way, the example 
of the brain-sciences can effectively be downplayed: The description 
of brain in the MR-scanner would just be one out of many examples of 
what spirit is. The “humanistic” idealist would maybe even take one 
step further and claim that the example of brain-sciences is not very 
existentially engaging: What this science describes “from without” 
must be described from an insider-perspective, or else the complexity 
of spirit is lost. But it is exactly here that a dialectician will take up 
the fight, maybe even seek it out. The example of the brain-sciences is 
interesting, precisely because the stakes are so high. Brain-sciences is 
an example of an approach which seriously tries to give an exhausting 
explanation of spirit, and thus it will eventually, this is the wager of 
the dialectician, end up in contradictions. Its example will undermine 
its own conceptual starting-point.  
This is why “observing reason” seems to arouse Hegel’s inter-
est. Something is played out in this example that contributes to the 
investigation of spirit, because it touches on some fundamental con-
flicts in the very concept. In The Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel does 
of course not investigate modern brain-sciences, but some sciences 
that today must strike us as somewhat odd; the science of physiogno-
my (“the assessment of character or personality from a person’s outer 
appearance”13) and the science of phrenology (which would then be: 
the assessment of a person’s character and personality from the form 
of his skull). There is no direct connection between e.g. phrenology 
and modern brain-science and a critique of the brain-sciences of today 
cannot simply be done by reference to Hegel’s critique of phrenology. 
What is interesting, however, is that a certain conflict is played out in 
both examples, and that they both fall within the borders of the para-
digm, which in broad terms can be termed “observing reason”. At the 
same time, something is to be learned from the way Hegel approaches 
this example of phrenology. He not only accepts the challenge, he goes 
all in, so to speak, and this is important in order to understand Hegel’s 
way of using examples; his method of the example. 
In the beginning of the investigation of the relation of self-con-
sciousness to its immediate actuality, we are presented with the philo-
sophical problematic of inner and outer. If spirit is something inner, 
how can we ever come to know it? In what kind of expressions can we 
come to know it? Hegel then presents us with (roughly) two different 
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ways to go: We could examine the expressions of spirit in the deed of 
men (as when you commit a murder), or we could examine the ex-
pressions of spirit in the mere shapes of corporeal material; we could 
perform hand reading, “chiromantia”, physiognomy, phrenology etc. It 
seems obvious that we should go in the direction of examining deeds as 
the expression of spirit, and Hegel first drags in this direction. Howev-
er, something is not solved if we do this. The solution is to some extent 
too ideal; by relying on a “humanistic” vision of deeds, it bypasses the 
central question. We did not truly engage in the challenge of investi-
gating observing reason as an exhaustive theory of spirit. Therefore, in-
stead of deeds, we have to discuss organs, brains, spinal cords and skulls.
To cut a long story short (and it is not my intention to go into 
the details of the argument here), Hegel ends up discussing phrenolo-
gy, and this is where we find the culmination of the drama in this pas-
sage. Spirit must be understood as a dead thing, if it has to satisfy the 
very standards of the position in question, namely observing reason. 
It cannot be the deed, it even cannot be the organ, not even the brain, 
which is still too vibrant, is has to be the skull. The actuality of spirit 
is turned into a thing, “the spirit is a bone”, as the famous dictum 
goes. 14However, at the same time as this result has been reached the 
final and fatal contraction of this position arises. If spirit is nothing 
but a dead thing, how can this dead thing then comprehend itself? 
How can a bone think itself as a bone? This is the last stage, the most 
vulgar and stupid stage of them all, says Hegel15, that observing reason 
reaches, and this is where some kind of reversal is called for. But this 
stage is still, nonetheless, very important for the further development 
of spirit; in the words of Hegel, “because Spirit is all the greater, the 
greater the opposition from which it has returned into itself; but it 
creates this opposition for itself by setting aside its immediate unity, 
and by alienating its being-for-self”16. The progression of spirit is de-
pendent on precisely such a radical identification with a given exam-
ple, even though this radical identification ends up in contradictions. 
This is what makes spirit “greater” than it was before (or simply what 
makes spirit spirit). What seems to be a methodological failure must 
be turned into a positive condition. It is only through sticking to the 
example that Hegel ends up transgressing it. Once again, at this stage, 
spirit is not something controlling the different succession of exam-
ples from behind the scenes; there are only these scenes. We have to 
follow the immediate consequences of this example, and nothing else, 
and it is only through doing this that the position is undermined.
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From the basis of the example of phrenology, I think one could 
rephrase the famous Hegelian “speculative proposition”17 in terms 
of concept and example: In the speculative use of examples, concept 
and example do not play their usual roles – in the same way as in the 
speculative proposition, subject and predicate do not play their usual 
roles. A speculative sentence is, according to Hegel, a sentence, which 
is produced by philosophy, and this is why philosophy so often is mis-
understood. A normal sentence of everyday-language has the struc-
ture of subject plus predicate; we say for example, “the rose is red”. In 
philosophy, the problem is that we do not simply operate by way of 
subject and predicate, but by way of subject and a substantial predicate. 
The predicate in a philosophical sentence describes – not some acci-
dental features of a thing – but the substantiality of the thing. When 
we say, and this is Hegel’s example, “God is being”, this is not the 
same kind of sentence as “the rose is red”. What we mean to say is that 
God substantially is being. In this way, the philosophical or speculative 
proposition causes trouble: We find ourselves thrown back into the 
subject of the sentence; if God is being, we sort of loose God to being. 
We lose the firm ground under our feet, we cannot refer back to God 
and simply describe God – God has a long beard, God is wise, God is 
old – because the very notion of God has suffered a counter-thrust in 
the speculative proposition. The attempt at defining God substanti-
ality destroys the otherwise self-evident ontological position of God. 
God is not simply God anymore, but also, substantially, being. And 
this is where thinking proper begins, this is where the concept, the no-
tion, itself begins to work, begins to move itself. Thinking is this very 
movement back and forth in a sentence, in a philosophical exposition, 
where subject becomes substance, and substance becomes subject.
Now, the same goes for the different dramatizations of spirit in 
the course of the book. We have spirit, which is subject, and we get the 
example, but the trick is that the example must be read as substantially 
it. There is no “mere” example, when we read Hegel in this way. Ev-
ery example is a substantial investigation of spirit, which even causes 
spirit to lose itself. “The spirit is a bone”, we learn in the section on 
the immediate actuality of spirit, and this is serious, because Hegel 
engages in this sentence philosophically, as if it were philosophy. The 
contradiction that spirit gets itself involved in here makes spirit great-
er than it was; the very example retroactively changes the stage that 
spirit was in.
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IV. THE MATERIALIST USE OF EXAMPLES
To conclude, and in the light of what I have argued about Hegel’s 
use of examples, let me rephrase what a materialist use of examples 
consists in. A materialist use of examples consists in a rather peculiar 
relation of concepts to examples, where concepts are subverted or un-
dermined by examples. Examples can be used to dramatize or stage 
the concept in question, not only for didactical reasons, but because 
something must be played out in this dramatization. The aim would 
be to confront the concepts with their own repressed kernel, as Žižek 
also puts it. The materialist use of examples is thus exactly also a high-
ly theoretical use of examples. It is not done for the sake of easing 
something, i.e. giving good examples of how to understand difficult 
things or learning to cope with difficult situations – it is not about 
defending a certain pragmatism of the example, where the abstract 
must be deflated into the concrete. The materialist use of examples is 
a critical enterprise. You use examples in this way, not when you want 
to enhance understanding of something, but when you want to trans-
form the understanding.
For Hegel, this means that we must give ourselves over to the ma-
terial of philosophy in a new way. When investigating spirit, we must 
stick to the conceptual framework of spirit trying to come to terms 
with itself. We must not engage in “loose” or detached phenomeno-
logical descriptions of anything that comes to mind. Hegel judges this 
kind of procedure rather hard, he calls it “material thinking”, which is 
the work of “a contingent consciousness that is absorbed only in ma-
terial stuff”18. Using examples in the true materialist sense is not like 
the technic of “stream of consciousness”, where you simply put down 
to paper everything that comes to mind, simply for the sake of de-
scribing all the things you know in the flow of the moment. You have 
to restrain yourself, to hold back, to not “intrude into the immanent 
rhythm of the Notion”, as Hegel puts it, and to not use “wisdom ob-
tained from elsewhere”19. Instead, you have to patiently follow a figure 
of consciousness to its own edge, where it shows what it is grounded in, 
and where it comes to display its own internal contradictions. Where, 
for example, the spirit is a bone and thinking is a thing. What is at 
stake here is, I think, very close to the way the psychoanalyst operates; 
what he must do is exactly not to intrude with wisdom, in order to set 
things right or explain things away – he must only intervene, either to 
push things further, to worsen things, or at the exact moment when 
the symptom begins to show itself. Neither Hegelian philosophy, nor 
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psychoanalysis, is about solving problems, it is simply about describ-
ing, showing problems, allowing them to be unfolded, played out, it is 
sometimes even about aggravating problems. The good example is, in 
these disciplines, when something is produced that hits the very core 
of a concept by subverting or transgressing it.
The materialist use of examples does not amount to some kind 
of finished theory or “world-view”. It is there whenever there is some-
thing more in the example than in the concept, this has been the sim-
ple definition, that I have been working with. It is there when one 
touches the real of the concept by way of an example. This can be done 
in different ways. It can be done in the way of Hegel, which investi-
gates forms of knowledge, and the turnover of spirit into something 
other than itself. It can be done in the way of Freud, who in his three 
books on the unconscious somehow creates the category of the un-
conscious through its own excessive examples. It can also be done in 
the way of the later Wittgenstein, who invents his own example-giv-
ing machine, testing different examples of language-use against each 
other, making them jar against each other. And it can be done in the 
witty and provocative way of Žižek, who uses examples to intervene 
into frozen conceptual frameworks.
As there is no neutral example, there is no neutral use of exam-
ples. And as we all use examples all the time, this is an excellent place 
to begin, if we want to think instead of simply reproducing.
1  See: http://www.phrasebank.manchester.ac.uk/giving-examples/
  (downloaded October 5th 2019).
2  Žižek 2012: 364
3  see also Žižek 2012: 364
4  Žižek 2008: 143
5  Žižek 2008: 142
6  See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mr._Magoo (downloaded 
  October 5th 2019).
7  Dolar 2016
8  In what follows I rely on Žižek 2012: 359-367.
9  such as Derrida 1986; Warminski 1981; Harvey 2002
10  Harvey 2002: ix
11  Harvey 2002: 154
12  Hegel 1977: 145-210
13  See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physiognomy (downloaded 
  October 5th 2019)
14  see Hegel 1977: 200 – translation altered
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